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F Introduction 
T 
he  1994 report on the demographic situation provided a detailed description of the 
situation in the European Union and analysed its origins. The Commission's intention 
was thus to present a general  reference framework relating to the main aspects of 
European population trends. 
This second  report continues this approach by taking a look at the medium and long-term 
perspectives. It is, however, more selective, in that the emphasis is on providing a first Com-
munity study focusing on the dominant factor in our demographic future: the extent and 
acceleration of the ageing process. 
Although demographic ageing is by no means a new phenomenon, it has now assumed un-
precedented proportions owing to the post-war 'baby boom', and  the 'baby bust' which 
immediately followed. Over the next few decades,  Europe will increasingly be confronted 
with the consequences  of these  past  demographic  upheavals.  The  recent  demographic 
changes mean that Member States will experience ageing in different ways and to differ-
ing degrees,  but in all of them there will be  numerous effects in  fields such  as the econ-
omy (in  its widest sense),  social  protection, solidarity between generations, and  the dia-
logue between the social  partners. 
As a result of the interdependence and the balance between the various factors and, above 
all, the specific situations in each  country, there is  no single answer to the question as to 
how best to adapt our systems to the foreseeable demographic changes.  Nevertheless,  it 
may be useful to develop at EU  level coherent means of measuring the effects of ageing, 
based on identical methods and consistent statistical data. This approach will make it pos-
sible to produce an  initial draft framework for any  discussion  and  analysis  of the econ-
omic and  social  changes which the Commission may seek to pursue in the future. In this 
context the aim of the report is to give an  input both to the debate initiated by the Com-
mission on the future of social protection ('The future of social protection: a framework for 
a European debate' COM(95) 466 final) and to the development of the European employ-
ment strategy ('The European employment strategy: recent progress and prospects for the 
future' COM(95) 465 final). 
This  is the concept applied in the following report, where the question is to quantify the 
role played by  purely demographic changes  in various aspects of economic and social  life 
in the EU. The report does not claim to provide the elements for economic forecasting, far 
from it; it merely attempts to pinpoint the constraints which future demographic changes, 
regardless of any other factors, will impose in related areas. 
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Figure 1 
The  moderate growth of the Union's population 
and the effects of successive enlargements 
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1986  1990  1994 1. The population of the Union: overview and perspectives 
E 
conomic  performance,  employment 
and  social  protection  are  currently 
sources  of  concern  to  all  Member 
States  of the  Union.  At Community  level, 
the situation has given rise to extensive dis-
cussions, coordination and even,  in the case 
of employment, the formulation of specific 
objectives such as those set out at the Essen 
and Cannes summits. The European Union is 
now  witnessing  a  specific  type  of  demo-
graphic  change  requiring  it to face  up  to 
the knock-on effects of previous major age-
pyramid  irregularities.  This  development 
imposes new conditions affecting how ques-
tions of employment and  social  protection 
are to be approached. It should certainly be 
taken into account, all the more so because 
it makes it possible to take a long-term view 
and  evaluate such  aspects  as  the  likely ef-
fects  of the Union's demographic develop-
ment in  these  two areas.  Let  us  therefore 
start by  considering the parameters of this 
demographic future. 
Towards a shrinking population? 
Regardless  of  the  development  scenario 
adopted  by  Eurostat,  future  population 
growth should be no faster than in the past. 
A glance  at the figures  since  1960  reveals 
that apart from the 'spurts'  resulting from 
the various  enlargements  of the  Commu-
nity,  population  growth  in  the  Union  has 
been slow. 
No sudden changes are  likely in the future. 
Moderate  immigration  and· the  continu-
ation of recent  fertility trends  might even 
lead to a fall in total population. 
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Figure 2 
The  declining demographic importance of the Union on a world scale 
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_, The  slow growth experienced by the Union 
is not a worldwide phenomenon. 
Although mortality and  fertility are  declin-
ing worldwide, and even  more rapidly than 
initially  estimated  by  the  United  Nations 
Statistical  Office (which  is  revising  its fore-
casts accordingly), the fall thus started is by 
no  means  g1v1ng  rise  to  an  absolute  de-
crease  in numbers: fertility is  still very high 
in  developing countries, where it applies to 
very  young  populations  (many  women  of 
childbearing age).  The  result  is that during 
the next century the Union's demographic 
weight in the world will decline. 
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Young and old people: reversal of the 
relative proportions of the population 
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More old and fewer young people:  Between now and the year 2025: 
the ageing process 
The most striking feature of Community de-
mography  is  the  nature  of ageing,  as  re-
flected by a faster increase in the elderly to 
young people ratio. The extent of Commu-
nity ageing takes a number of forms. 
The  median  age  (the  age  separating  the 
population  into two groups of equal  size) 
increased by only four years (from 32 to 36) 
between 1960 and 1995.  Between now and 
2025,  a  shorter  period,  it wil l  increase  by 
more than twice that, to 45. 
The proportions of the population aged less 
than 20  or more than 60  years  respectively 
will reverse  by  2025.  The  younger group  is 
currently  larger,  but the  relative  sizes  will 
approach  equality  by  around  2025,  after 
which the proportion accounted for by the 
older group will grow continuously. 
Over  the  next  30  years,  the three  groups 
broadly  corresponding  to  the  social  and 
economic structure in terms of the role they 
play (children and students (i.e. those econ-
omically dependent),  active  adults,  retired 
adults)  will  undergo  considerable  changes 
in numbers. 
(i) The number of young people aged under 
20  will fall by  9.5  million, or 11%. This will 
have a direct impact on the organization of 
services  targeted  specifically  at the  young 
(educational  infrastructure  for  example) 
and attention must be paid to ensuring that 
their quality of life and scope for fulfilment 
is  preserved  despite their decreasing  nu m-
ber. 
(ii)  The  'adults  of working age' group will 
also  decline,  but to a  lesser  extent (6.4%}. 
Nevertheless,  this  age  group  will  lose  13 
million people,  significantly altering human 
resource availability. 
(iii) Retired adults will see their numbers in-
crease  by  over  37  million,  a  rise  of some 
50%.  This  spectacular increase  is  the result 
of  'baby  boomers'  progressively  reaching 
retirement  age.  Against  this  background, 
how can  funding for  pensions  and  health 
services be guaranteed? 
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Population variation 
Percentage increase 
between 1  977 and 1992* 
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0  data not available 
* Certain data for Germany:  1989-92 
* French overseas departments: 1982-92 
* Border of Ireland:  1977-89 
* Some data of Netherlands: 1979-92 
• Austria,  Finland:  1981-92 
• Sweden: 1985-92 
Sources: Eurostat; GISCO department. 
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eurostat Regional differences with drastic 
consequences 
Regional  disparities  in  such  demographic 
characteristics are  becoming a source of se-
rious concern. Highly uneven distribution of 
ageing  could  completely  derail  the  job-
creation  potential  in  the  regions  and  in-
crease  the  concentration  of  needs,  and 
hence  resources,  relating to the infrastruc-
ture  supplying  specific  services.  This  could 
give  rise  to major inequalities in  the scope 
individual  regions  have  to  achieve  econ-
omic and demographic growth. Against this 
background,  the  information  shown  on 
Map 1 (NUTS  3 level) calls for specific com-
ment. 
Towards spatial duality and bigger cities 
In  several  Member  States,  the  data  show 
both limited and extensive areas of depopu-
lation  and  other,  smaller,  zones  of demo-
graphic  growth.  A  number of factors  are 
common to these population growth zones: 
(i) the attraction of the southern coastal  re-
gions, as a result of their better climate and 
the associated  industrial development; 
(ii) the increasing density of metropolis pop-
ulations,  associated  with  depopulation  of 
the city centres (examples  include the Paris 
region); 
(iii)  population  concentration  in  corridors 
more or less  linking the major cities. 
Depopulation  equals  disruption of the re-
gional demographic structure 
A population decline in certain regions, such 
as  in  the former East  Germany,  may  result 
from  emigration  and  a  decline  in  natural 
growth. It generally gives  rise to significant 
imbalances in the population structure. 
These  two factors - the former particularly 
affecting adults and the second,  by  its very 
nature, more often young people- have an 
extensive  stimulatory effect on  the  ageing 
of populations,  with  all  the  consequences 
that this can  have  for the development of 
the regions concerned. 
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Figure 4 
Trends in the economic indicator of  fertility over the past 40 years 
Data for Switzerland and Norway have been added to illustrate the geographical dimension of 
homogeneous demographic behaviour. 
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ageing 
1. The fall in fertility 
By  reducing year after year the numbers of 
newborn children, the fall in fertility which 
began  about  1965  has  now  produced  an 
age  pyramid  steadily  narrowing  towards 
the base. 
Past  long-term fertility trends  do  seem  to 
provide some  evidence for the spread  of a 
model which would see the countries of the 
Union  converging  at  much  more  uniform 
levels  than  40  years  ago.  However,  varia-
tions in the rate of decrease, and the consid-
erable differences in the point of departure 
(see Figure 4)  mean that Member States are 
experiencing the ageing process in very dif-
ferent ways. 
Four different fertility patterns can  be iden-
tified: 
(i) the northern countries (Sweden,  Finland 
and Denmark) are notable for the upturn in 
fertility towards the end  of the 1980s:  cur-
rent  levels  are  the  highest  in  the  Union 
(between  1. 7  and  2.1)  despite  a  recent 
downward turn; 
(ii) the central countries (United  Kingdom, 
the Netherlands,  Belgium,  France  and  Lux-
embourg), where since  about 1975  fertility 
has  fluctuated at levels  lower than the 2.1 
threshold which would maintain the popu-
lation (1.5 to 1.8); 
(iii)  Germany  and  Austria,  with  a  similar 
demographic  history,  where  the  'baby 
boom' took place earlier and  fertility levels 
have  remained  very  low (1.4 to 1.6) for al-
most 20 years; 
(iv)  the  southern  countries  and  Ireland 
where the fall  in  fertility came  much  later, 
but was  sudden  and  has  not yet stabilized 
(1.1 to 1.4). Accordingly, a significant dispro-
portion  between  the  < 45  and  45 +  age-
groups  can  be  expected  around  the  year 
2025 in these countries. 
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Longer life: progress 
and convergence within the Union 
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Since  1960,  life expectancy has  increased  in 
all  countries,  but it  is  interesting  to note 
that the greatest progress has been in those 
countries  where,  initially,  life  expectancy 
was  the  shortest.  In  the  past,  this  rapid 
progress was  primarily due to reducing  in-
fant mortality. Nowadays, it involves partic-
ularly those  aged  over  60,  thanks  to the 
progress  achieved  in  the  prevention  and 
treatment  of  cardiovascular  diseases  and 
cancer. Another major contributor has been 
a shift towards a better lifestyle- balanced 
diets, cessation of smoking, participation in 
sport and regular medical checks. 
When it comes  to death,  men  and  women 
are  not always  equal.  On  average,  women 
still live approximately six years longer than 
men, which means that the elderly popula-
tion is predominantly female.  However,  ad-
vances  in  life  expectancy  run  parallel  for 
both sexes. 
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GREAT SOCIAL AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN  LIFE  EXPECTANCY 
Longer life is  not a self-evident fact, it results from a combination of behavioural factors (diet, 
smoking, sport, medical supervision) which are themselves strongly influenced by socioeconomic 
status (education, type of work, income,  unemployment), together with technical  progress and 
advances in medical knowledge, the quality of the environment (exposure to harmful agents) and 
social  progress (access to appropriate care,  prevention of disease and accidents,  information). 
These parameters reveal significant regional and social differences, creating major health dispar-
ities. It would be worthwhile taking a detailed look at them at regional level. 
COULD IMMIGRATION BE USED TO COMPENSATE FOR DEMORAPHIC AGEING? 
The question is often asked,  and it is useful to have the facts to answer it. As  noted above, age-
ing involves an  increase  in the proportion of the older generations in  relation to the younger 
ones. The following graph shows two curves: the lower one comprises the migration balance (im-
migrants minus emigrants) estimated in  accordance with a 'medium' scenario;  in other words, a 
net immigration of 525  000  per year.  The  upper curve  represents the net immigration to the 
Union which would be necessary to maintain the 60+: 20-59 years ratio at its 1995 level. 
In comparison to current levels, net immigration to the Union would have to rise from half a mil-
lion to 5 to 7 million for the 'baby boom' effect to disappear completely- even though the basic 
method used  for calculations  is  the least favourable towards ageing  in that it ignores ageing 
among migrants themselves and instead regards them all as being in the active age category. The 
results of this simulation show just how inevitable demographic ageing in the Union really is. 
Flgure 6 
To  compensate for the effects of  the baby boom 
would require 8 to 14 times as many immigrants 
as is the case today. 
- Levels necessary to compensate totally for ageing 
- Immigrants under the 'medium' scenario 
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N  N  N Migration: a major role in growth. 
but inadequate compensation for 
ageing 
Statistics available for the analysis of migra-
tion  flows  are  unfortunately  incomplete 
and  often  not  comparable  between  the 
Member  States.  For  example,  some  coun-
tries classify  asylum  seekers  as  immigrants, 
whereas others do not. Nevertheless, the in-
formation we do have on flows into the Eu-
ropean Union is sufficient to identify a num-
ber of background trends. 
(i} Migration flows into the Union have, par-
ticularly  in  recent  years,  been  very  closely 
associated  with  particular historical  events 
(German  unification,  the  break-up  of the 
Communist Bloc and the conflict in the for-
mer Yugoslavia}.  It is  unlikely that the high 
levels  of  immigration  observed  between 
1990 and  1994 (over 1 million per year} will 
continue. It should be noted that during the 
1970s,  the  annual  average  was  approxi-
mately 300 000, turning by the beginning of 
the 1980s into net emigration. 
(ii} In  recent  decades,  controlled  immigra-
tion of workers has progressively given way 
to  the  immigration  of migrants'  families, 
and to asylum seekers. This  is  shown by the 
fact that the number of foreigners as a pro-
portion  of  the  entire  workforce  has  re-
mained steady. 
(iii} While  migration  between  the  Union 
and third countries is  highly cyclical,  mobil-
ity between Member States shows a funda-
mental trend: a decrease in migration flows 
or,  at  least,  stabilization  at  relatively  low 
levels.  Unfortunately, data  in  this field  are 
patchy  and  of  varying  quality.  More  de-
tailed  investigation  would  help  to  under-
stand  migratory  movements  at  different 
geographical levels and thus to situate them 
in their own particular context. 
(iv) Given the fall in fertility and the ageing 
of the  population,  the  migration  balance 
will become  an  increasingly important fac-
tor in demographic growth in the Union. 
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f= 2.  The demographic future 
T 
he demographic future of the Union is 
therefore  determined  by  four  major 
trends:  a general,  more  or less  immi-
nent,  fall  in  population,  a  decline  in  the 
number of children and young people, a sig-
nificant drop in  the  number of people  of 
working age and, finally, an explosion in the 
number of people approaching  retirement 
and  old  age.  These  factors,  which  as  we 
have seen  are structural and not curable by 
migration  (given  the  latter's  present  scale 
relative to the magnitude of  these changes), 
necessitate an in-depth study of their conse-
quences on employment, education and so-
cial  interaction in its entirety. 
The demographic trends just described, and 
whose 'timebomb' effects will have  a vary-
ing - but always  powerful - impact in  the 
Member States,  will be felt in a great many 
fields. 
1. The economy in its wider sense 
Hitherto centred  around  a certain  type of 
goods  and  services,  the labour market will 
have  to  adapt to a  different kind  of de-
mand, principally in the fields of education, 
housing,  health, transport and  leisure.  This 
will  have  to  be  done  precisely  at  a  time 
when those  producing the resources  need-
ed  by the economy are  steadily decreasing 
in  numbers  and  when  the future  genera-
tions (who will have to be  highly educated 
and trained if growth is to be achieved) will 
also be fewer and fewer in number. 
2. Social protection and solidarity 
between generations 
Around the turn of the century,  the demo-
graphic  inflation  of  the  baby  boom  will 
gradually begin to affect the 'retired' cate-
gory.  This  will  generate  new problems for 
the funding and  organization of social  pro-
tection, affecting pension systems as well as 
employment, for example through the need 
to create new services as the number of very 
old  persons  increases.  All  aspects  of social 
and  family life will  be  thus  dominated  by 
the  needs  of older  people.  What  conces-
sions  will the elderly be  prepared to make 
to the younger generations,  and  how will 
the latter finance pensions? There can be no 
doubt  that  the  principle  of  solidarity 
between  generations will emerge as  a key 
factor in the adjustments which will have to 
be made. 
3.  The  conditions  for  dialogue 
between the social partners 
With ageing,  and  if present rates  of econ-
omic  growth  are  maintained,  the average 
incomes of citizens are likely to be affected. 
Collective agreements will have to take ac-
count  of new  redistribution  models,  in  a 
situation  in  which  the  reorganization  of 
work  in  terms  of  both  structure  and 
working  hours  may  constitute  a  necessary 
response to demographic change. 
How can  our systems  be  adapted to demo-
graphic  change?  This  is  the  key  question, 
but one that cannot be  answered  in  isola-
tion.  The  phenomena  involved  are  inter-
linked and  strategies must ally purely econ-
omic imperatives with the social  dimension 
of the proposed change.  It is  mainly by en-
suring respect for and full use of its human 
resources that the Union will succeed in con-
verting what is currently seen  as  a problem 
into an advantage. 
As an aid to analysing the situation, the role 
of demographic  change  is  assessed  below 
from two points of view:  employment and 
social  protection.  An  attempt  is  made  to 
provide preliminary figures to assist evalua-
tion  of the impact  on  these  two areas  of 
shifts in population structure in the medium 
and  long term. 
~ 
21 2.1. The demographic future and employment 
Activity: room for growth 
A 
mong all the possible solutions for re-
launching economic growth, the most 
popular  is  a  general  increase  in  the 
level  of employment.  In  theory,  and  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  population  of 
working  age,  the  preconditions  for doing 
this are clearly in place. 
(i) The proportion of active women over the 
age  of  15  is  significantly  lower  than  the 
equivalent figure for men, especially among 
the older age groups. In all cases there is still 
considerable  scope  for  increasing  activity 
and employment rates. 
(ii)  The  young  are  particularly  affected  by 
unemployment,  especially  when  we  con-
sider  the  proportion  of the  young  active 
population  who  are  unemployed.  Integra-
tion of young  people into the labour mar-
ket represents a priority objective. 
Figure  7 
(iii)  The  impact of early  retirement  means 
that there are only half as  many workers in 
the 60  to 65  age  group as  in  the 55  to 59 
group, although the difference in the sizes 
of these two age groups is smaller. The man-
agement of retirement  has  contributed to 
the fall in the population in employment. 
The present demographic situation thus of-
fers considerable scope  for raising  levels of 
employment. In this context, one might con-
sider  how  medium-term  demographic 
changes could perhaps affect this situation. 
Present demographic structure and structure of the active population 
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Ageing of the population of working age 
Growth 1995-2005 
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EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHY ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL PROTECTION: 
METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SELECTION OF AGE GROUPS 
The normal convention is to consider people aged between 15 and 64 as the population of work-
ing age. Of course, this is not entirely correct as, on the one hand, it does not cover all active per-
sons (some persons over the age of 65 continue to work), while, on the other hand, it includes a 
group (people aged 15) which in some Member States is excluded from the labour market by law. 
- However, the advantage of this convention is that it allows comparisons to be made. 
24 
From the point of view of activity, it is known that the activity rates for the age groups at either 
end of the scale (15 to 19 years and 60 to 64 years) are well below that for the 20 to 59 age group 
and, above all, that the activity of these groups is much less stable, in as far as the rates per year 
of age are distributed in a non-uniform manner and vary considerably in time (longer periods of 
study  for young  people,  early  retirement for older people).  Furthermore,  for methodological 
reasons, the model used in this report to measure the impact of ageing on social protection (see 
below) necessitates  the selection  of a more stable group,  as  demographic changes  within the 
group must be correlated with changes in its active population.  This is why, in this report, the 20 
to 59 age group is treated separately within the population of working age. In other words, anal-
ysis does not relate to the population of working age in the stricter sense, but only to the group 
within this population which presents the optimum conditions from the point of view of measur-
ing the impact of ageing. 
It should also be noted that the assessments presented below merely constitute the initial phase 
of modelling and assume a constant activity rate in the future. Furthermore, analyses of  trends and 
variations in activity and employment rates and of  their economic and social consequences are pre-
sented each year in the Commission's report 'Employment in Europe'. Within 10 years, significant 
changes in the population 
of working age 
At  the  present  time,  the  population  of 
working  age  consists  of 249.1  million  per-
sons,  of  whom  210.4  million  are  aged 
between  20  and  59.  Within a decade  it is 
likely to grow by  between  1.5 and  5.5  mil-
lion  (Eurostat's  'low' and  'high' scenarios}, 
which might encourage the growth of em-
ployment.  However,  the  internal  structure 
of this  group  will  be  transformed  signifi-
cantly in both cases. 
(i) The  number of young people aged  15 to 
19  will  decline  by  just  over  one  million 
(- 5%). 
(ii) The  number of persons  aged  20  to 29 
will  fall  on  average  by  9  million  (- 17%). 
These  are  the very  groups  which  are  cur-
rently  worst  affected  by  unemployment. 
This gives rise to the question as to whether 
demographic changes might reabsorb some 
of the employment in this category. 
(iii) The  30 to 49  age group will increase by 
7.5  million (+ 7%).  In  numerical terms,  it is 
this  group which  is  likely to see  the most 
favourable increase in activity rates. 
(iv) The  number of persons  aged  50  to 59 
will grow by  5.5  million(+ 12%), and  keep-
ing them in  work takes on a particular sig-
nificance in the context of achieving a high 
rate of employment. 
(v) The  60 to 64 age group, i.e. persons ap-
proaching the upper working age limit, will 
grow by around 1 million, compensating for 
the fall in the number of people joining the 
15 to 19 category. 
-
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In the next 10  years, demographic 
changes alone will not solve 
unemployment problems 
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QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE AGEING OF THE POPULATION OF WORKING AGE 
Like the total population, the population of working age is also ageing, i.e. the number of older 
workers among the active population is  increasing  in comparison with the number of younger 
workers. Furthermore, in the overall context of the Union, it might in future be  necessary to in-
crease  the presence  of older workers on the labour market to meet production requirements. 
Even  if these questions do not enter directly into the framework of this report, three of them 
should be mentioned and will necessitate more detailed analysis in the future. 
• What is the link between the average age of workers and productivity? 
• Since average wages rise with age, what will be the effect of working-age demographic ageing 
on company finances? 
•  As young workers trained in the most recent developments in their fields help to improve the 
average skill level of the workforce, how can this level be maintained or even increased given the 
drop in the number of young people coming in? 34 000 000 
50 to 59  age group 
32 000 000 
30 000 000 
28 000 000  r 
26 000 000 
24 000 000 
22 000 000 
1995  1997  1999 
Decline in population of working 
age  equals  decline  in  unemploy-
ment? 
An equation which is far from be-
ing confirmed 
In order to assess how demographic changes 
within the labour market could themselves 
reduce unemployment, a very cursory simu-
lation  exercise  for  each  of the  three  age 
groups has been carried out. This exercise  is 
of course limited to analysis, the specific-aim 
being  to give  an  idea  of the  sensitivity of 
unemployment  to  demographic  changes 
and  possibly  to  changes  in  employment 
rates. 
In  Figure 9: 
eline 3 indicates the number of persons  in 
employment in 1995; 
• the top curve  (1)  shows  the trend in  the 
number of active persons if  the 1995 activity 
rate for this group is maintained; 
. the middle curve (2) shows the trend in the 
number of employees if there is to be an an-
nual  rise  in  the employment  rate  of 0.5% 
since  1995. 
2001  2003  2005 
The  fall  in  unemployment resulting from a 
rise  in  the  employment  rate  of 0.5%  per 
year since 1995 varies between 6.1  and 7.8% 
over the last  11  years.  However,  owing to 
different  initial  unemployment  levels,  un-
employment  among  the  youngest  group 
would  still  be  nearly  9.9%  (originally 
16.6%),  whilst  unemployment  among  the 
30  to 49  age  group would be  significantly 
lower (2.33%).  As  for people at the end  of 
their working lives,  the demographic effect 
would  completely  cancel  out  unemploy-
ment. 
-
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Figure 10 
National differences in  the impact of demography 
on employment between 1995 and 2005 
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SPOTLIGHT ON THE REGIONAL DIMENSION 
The map of Europe today is  a mosaic of areas of relative prosperity and others which are in de-
cline. The cause is a disturbance in the balance between supply and demand at regional level, for-
merly largely ensured by internal mobility. The active population is becoming less and less mobile. 
Regional disparities between population mobility and the geographical distribution of jobs may 
lead to disruptions which are  accentuated  by  differences in  population structure.  But if a low 
level  of development encourages  emigration by  potential workers,  as  was  the case  in  certain 
regions of Europe in the past,  the inevitable consequence  is the intensification of demographic 
structure  imbalances  between  regions,  with  attractive  ones  becoming  younger  while  those 
suffering an exodus experience even faster ageing. ,. 
National  disparities  in  variations 
in the population of working age 
The  fact  that population structures  in  the 
Member States  differ owing to the timing 
and scale of the demographic changes expe-
rienced  has  a direct effect on  any compari-
son  of labour market trends over the next 
10 years. 
With the exception  of Italy,  in  all  Member 
States where the decline in fertility has been 
more  recent  (Ireland,  southern  Member 
States),  the effect of the split between the 
numbers of young and old people is not ex-
pected to be  felt until later.  In  these coun-
tries, the 20 to 29  age group would there-
fore decline  only slightly  in  the short and 
medium term. 
However, in most Member States, the num-
bers  likely to join the active population are 
likely to fall sharply,  by  between 10%  and, 
in some cases,  nearly 30%. 
Among  the  oldest  groups,  the  opposite 
trend  is  expected:  in  Member States  with 
the oldest  population  structures,  increases 
in the number of older workers would vary 
between 10 and 40%. 
These  important changes,  even  over such  a 
short period, would lead to a fall in the to-
tal  20  to 59  age  group population  in  Italy 
and  especially  in  Germany,  thus  requiring 
the labour market to adjust rapidly. 
These  few very  cursory  elements  illustrate 
the demographic dimension of employment 
trends. Eventually, additional in-depth analy-
ses  will supplement this approach,  as  there 
are still many outstanding questions relating 
to demography,  such  as  the role  of unem-
ployment  in  dependency  relationships,  the 
impact of shifts in demographic structure on 
the process of labour force renewal, the ec-
onomic  significance  of the  increase  in  the 
number of single  persons  based  on  the ef-
fect of differential mortality, or the associa-
tion  between  labour  force  flexibility  and 
age, by sector of activity. A draft monograph 
on the effects of demographic ageing in the 
Union  is  being  prepared  and  within a few 
months should provide more extensive analy-
ses  as a basis for a reply to these questions. 
-
29 2.2. The demographic future and social protection 
S 
ocial  protection is  generally defined as 
the  set  of  transfer  mechanisms  de-
signed to protect citizens against social 
risks,  such  as  sickness,  maternity, work inca-
pacity,  unemployment,  old  age  and  the 
death of one's partner, dependence and fam-
ily responsibilities.  In  these connections, the 
role  of demographic  changes  needs  to  be 
looked at from different angles, given that: 
- since  the establishing  of social  protection 
systems,  demographic changes  have  had fun-
damental effects on the very nature of  the var-
ious social risks, thus altering the conditions for 
the functioning of transfer mechanisms; 
- among these  mechanisms,  demographic 
changes have a bearing on financial aspects, 
affecting  both the  balance  of systems  and, 
indirectly, economic growth, through the in-
comes and behaviour of different categories 
of persons in society (consumption, saving); 
- demographic changes  have  implications 
for certain  societal  aspects,  through the so-
cial implications of the first two aspects (soli-
darity between generations, social cohesion). 
Over  the  next  25  years,  the  sustained  in-
crease  in  ageing which will be  produced as 
'baby-boomers' gradually reach  retirement 
age  above all  raises the question of financ-
ing. This  aspect will be  all the more crucial 
in that, in contrast with the increase in the 
number of retired people, the population of 
working age  will  be  declining (-13 million 
for the  20  to  59  age  group).  Among  the 
older age groups, demographic changes will 
lead to a significant increase in the number 
of very  old  persons, 
1  whose  health service 
consumption  is  well  above the average.  If 
per  capita  spending  remains  the  same, 
health expenditure is  thus  I  ikely to rise.  In 
these two major sectors of social protection, 
funding needs  will, without any  doubt, go 
up sharply. But before attempting an evalu-
ation of these needs,  let us  recall a number 
of  fundamental  demographic  changes 
which  have  affected  the context  in  which 
social  protection  has  existed  since  its 
creation. 
The changing context 
Since the establishment of most social  pro-
tection  systems,  a  whole  range  of demo-
graphic,  economic  and  social  aspects  have 
undergone radical and lasting changes, thus 
altering the framework for the provision of 
social  protection.  These  new  elements  in-
clude: 
- different conditions for subsequent gen-
erations; 
- changes in family structures; 
- changes in the employment situation; 
- changes  in  the  relationships  between 
family life and working life. 
Future  demographic  ageing  could  further 
accentuate  these  economic  and  social 
changes. 
The  changing profiles of successive  genera-
tions 
There  are  major  differences  in  terms  of 
numbers,  and  also  in  the social  and  econ-
omic  characteristics  of  successive  gener-
ations. The  incomes and  living standards of 
today's retired  people  are  largely founded 
on  employment and  social  security models 
which will no longer fully apply to the next 
generations of retired people. 
Solidarity  between  generations,  from  the 
point of view of the financial responsibility 
for retired  people  and  old  people  in  gen-
eral, will probably have to face up to the im-
plications of this new variable. 
' See  Figure 18. 
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Figure 1.1 
Families past and present 
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5  10  15  20  25  30 Changes within the family 
The  social  status  of women  has  changed, 
but at the same time the family model  has 
disintegrated, to be  replaced  by  individual 
patterns of great complexity.  Not only are 
certain  social  protection  systems  based  on 
the traditional concept of the family model 
(families  mainly  dependent  on  the  hus-
band's income alone, with marriages ending 
only on the death of one of the partners), 
but some  of them  also  presume the provi-
sion of family support for the very old. 
Given  the  context  of family  changes,  the 
possibility for families to assume  such  sup-
port could  necessitate  certain  adjustments 
to the labour market and the organization 
of social  protection: 
In  this  context,  it would  be  interesting to 
look at the new possibilities offered by the 
development  and  spread  of  information 
technologies. 
Changes in the employment situation 
The employment scene  has undergone fun-
damental  changes,  from  three  important 
angles, imposing a new order on social  pro-
tection. 
-the population of working age is becom-
ing more vulnerable to unemployment. The 
social  protection implications of this are an 
increase in unemployment expenditure and 
a fall in contributions levied on wages; 
- as a result of the combined effect of the 
prolongation  of  education  (which  means 
that people  start working  later)  and  early 
retirement, the number of years  of contri-
butions to social  protection  per  employee 
has fallen in the course of time; 
- wage security has been adversely affect-
ed  by  an  increase  in  temporary  and  part-
time work, thus affecting the conditions for 
retirement  pension  insurance  and  increas-
ing the risks of exclusion. 
In  the face  of these trends,  it is  possible to 
evaluate the benefits to the Union of regen-
erating employment. For example, if an em-
ployment  rate  of 70%  could  be  achieved 
throughout  the  Union  (the  level  in  the 
Member  States  in  which  it is  highest,  and 
also  in  the United States),  30  million addi-
tional  jobs  would  be  created.  This  would 
have  a  favourable  effect  on  the  basic 
scenarios for the funding of certain aspects 
of social  protection. 
-
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There is no absolutely clear link between 
female activity and fertility in the Union. 
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DOES THE  DECLINE IN FERTILITY REDUCE  'FAMILY/MATERNITY' EXPENDITURE? 
The decline in fertility which is  behind the ageing phenomenon might at first sight be expected 
eventually to result in a fall in social protection costs under the heading 'family/maternity'. How-
ever, several factors restrict the scope for savings: 
• family and maternity benefits account for only a small proportion of social protection expendi-
ture (less than 8%, as against 45% for pensions/survivors' benefits and 34% for health); 
• changes in lifestyles (partnerships and families breaking up and reforming) could result in new 
costs; 
• the shift in fertility towards the older age groups increases the costs associated with childbirth, 
as older mothers are considered to be more at risk and require more prenatal care; 
• the fall in the number of children in the past has not automatically produced an equivalent fall 
in per capita expenditure on childcare and education. The increase in female activity 
One  of  the  most  marked  social  develop-
ments  of this century  has  been  the  large-
scale  investment  of women  in  the  labour 
force. However, this trend still poses various 
problems in that: 
- the organization of work and services in 
general (childcare facilities, timetables), still 
lacks flexibility and  has  not yet taken suffi-
cient account of the increased  need to rec-
oncile work and  private life; 
-within couples, women still tend to bear 
primary  responsibility  for  'family  matters' 
(housework,  looking after children),  which 
places a dual load on most working women; 
- access  for women  to the  employment 
market on  an  equal  footing with men  has 
not yet  been  achieved,  and  general  prob-
lems  constituting  de  facto  discrimination 
still remain; 
- reconciliation between work and  family 
life  more  generally  poses  the  problem  of 
the respective development of male and fe-
male  roles.  In  this  context,  attention  is 
drawn to the agreement between the Euro-
pean  social  partners  (UNICE,  CEEP  and 
ETUC)  on  parental  leave,  which constitutes 
an important contribution to the promotion 
of  equal  opportunities  and  reconciliation 
between work and family life.  -
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THE BASIC MODEL USED TO ACCESS THE  IMPACT OF AGEING 
The  model set  out below constitutes a useful  starting  point for measuring the demo-
graphic impact of ageing on the cost of retirement pensions. From an  initial assessment 
of the inevitable costs  (phase  1),  various  parametric simulations will be  carried  out to 
measure  the effect and  estimate the limits of each  variable  introduced. The  model  is 
based on a distribution scheme; the following parameters and  hypotheses are involved. 
This initial model will subsequently be fine-tuned to take account of additional aspects 
which exist in  practice and to give a more balanced reflection of the situation. 
For the moment, this model gives only a partial representation of reality, but is still very 
useful as, in addition to quantifying the inevitable effect of ageing on growth, it also al-
lows us to measure, through the results which it has given for each  Member State (see 
Annex), at which point the demographic differential plays an  important role in the na-
ture, extent and timing of the effects of ageing. 
PARAMETERS 
•  Number of active persons 
•  Number of retired persons 
•  Average wage 
•  Average per capita production 
•  Average rate of pension contributions 
•  Rate  of transfer (ratio  between  average 
pension and average wage) 
ASSUMPTIONS 
•  Persons aged 20 to 59 have the character-
istics of the active population 
•  Persons  aged  60  and  over have the char-
acteristics of the retired population (retire-
ment at 60 for everyone) 
•  All active persons are wage/salary earners 
•  Production  is  entirely  used  for  paying 
wages and pensions 
•  Variable dependent on wage and production 
•  Fixed at 0.75% (it is assumed that average 
pension is constant and equivalent to three-
quarters of the average wage) The  active population is  not expected to be able to compensate for this 
6 300 000  ~---------------------------, 
Persons aged  20 years 
5300000 ~-----~----------------~ 
4 800 000 
- Low 
__  Medium 
3 300 000 
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The  population of working age -
difference in the numbers joining 
and leaving 
Figure  3 provided  a first  indication of the 
net variations  up to the year  2025  in  the 
various  population  age  groups.  It  is 
interesting  to note,  again  on  the  basis  of 
the various scenarios,  how the replacement 
of  the  working-age  population  will 
progress, year after year, thus allowing us to 
assess and date the differences between the 
numbers of people joining and  leaving this 
category. This  will constitute a useful  piece 
of  information  for  assessing  the  role  of 
demographic ageing in the pensions sector. 
Demographic  ageing  as  found  in  the 
European Union is  resulting in a substantial 
increase  in the number of old  people. This 
increase  will  be  particularly  marked  soon 
after the turn of the century, and each year 
there will be  an  increase  in  the number of 
persons  reaching  the age  of 60. Under the 
'medium'  scenario,  their  number  will  rise 
from  4.0  million  in  1995  to  5.9  million  in 
2025.  Growth  will  be  particularly  marked 
after  2006,  with  annual  numbers  of  new 
pensioners never before encountered. 
This  represents  a  sharp  contrast  with  the 
future  trend  in  the  number  of  persons 
c; 
(")  1.!)  I'- O'l  (")  1.!)  I'- O'l  C:;:j 
(")  1.!) 
C>  C>  C>  C>  c;  c;  c;  c;  c;  N  N 
C>  C>  C>  C>  C>  C>  C>  C> 
N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  N 
reaching  the  age  of  20.  The  number  of 
young  people  reaching  the  age  of  20, 
5.1 million in  1995, will fall to 4.2  million in 
2025. 
Initial spotlight on the analysis to 
be undertaken 
In order to assess the effect of demographic 
ageing  on  a per capita  production  basis,  a 
first  model  has  been  designed,  on  which 
various  parametric  tests  will  subsequently 
be  performed. Of course,  we are in  no way 
talking about a model which would take ac-
count of the complexity of economic inter-
actions,  which  have  yet to be  introduced. 
On  the  other  hand,  this  much  simplified 
model offers the advantage of isolating the 
purely  demographic  impact  of population 
ageing in that it measures the effect of vari-
ations in the numbers entering and  leaving 
specific age groups. 
The  first results of this model are shown in 
Figure 15. They indicate, on  an  annual basis 
and  as  an  average  for the EU  as  a whole, 
how much of annual per capita productivity 
growth will be  cancelled  out by the purely 
demographic effect on  pensions.  Over  the 
next  10  years,  this  will  remain  at a similar 
level  to the  past:  between  0.1 and  0.3%. 
However, after 2005 the demographic effect 
-
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~ will be more pronounced, probably giving a 
figure  of more  than  0.5%  per  year.  For  a 
better appreciation of this, it can  be consid-
ered  in  relation to three  GDP  growth  hy-
potheses. 
Let us take three hypotheses of constant an-
nual growth of 1,  2 and 3%  up to 2025.  De-
ducting the 'cost' of the demographic bur-
den,  the model  gives  reduced  real  growth 
of 0.5,  1.5  and  2.5%  respectively,  an  effect 
which is far from negligible. 
Of course,  these  initial  results  are  depen-
dent on  the hypotheses  adopted. The  fact 
that these are conservative clearly illustrates 
the order of magnitude of the problem. The 
work  in  progress  in  connection  with  the 
monograph on the effects of demographic 
ageing will make it possible to establish the 
sensitivity of the final response to the vari-
ous parameters. 
Clearly,  it is  constantly becoming more of a 
priority to identify the best way of adapting 
our  economic  and  social  organization  to 
these  new situations. Appropriate data for 
quantity analysis  and  the development  of 
models to test the effects of the various var-
iables  on  the  different systems  will  be  ex-
tremely  useful  in  evaluating  the  different 
options and understanding exactly how the 
differences  in  the  previous  demographic 
situations in the Member States  are  at the 
root of their specific  features  today,  espe-
cially with reference to social  protection. 
Procedure for parametric analysis 
based on the model 
Through its variables, the model in question 
develops  options  which  are  nevertheless 
linked to real circumstances. Clearly, if aver-
age  per  capita  production  is  fixed,  output 
under the model will be  related to produc-
tivity with employment parity. It is precisely 
by subsequently varying this parameter that 
it will be  possible,  on  the basis  of a given 
demographic scenario and  in a comparative 
perspective, to test how productivity should 
increase  in order to compensate for demo-
graphic changes. 
The model presented here makes it possible to 
vary the four independent parameters which 
it contains. To clarify its use, it will be useful to 
explain  precisely how these  different param-
eters could be used to estimate how the inev-
itable  effects  of  ageing,  as  previously 
measured and presented, can  be limited. 
Variation of activity rates 
Under the first hypothesis, the model main-
tains parity between demographic changes 
and  changes  in  the  active  population.  By 
acting upon the parameter determining the 
active  population  under the  model,  it will 
be  possible  to measure  the  benefit to be 
gained  from  an  increase  in  activity  rates. 
The model should then be completed in or-
der to distinguish, within the active popula-
tion,  between  unemployed  persons  and 
those in employment. 
At the moment, there are major discrepan-
cies  between the Member States as  regards 
activity  rates.  Some  have  high  levels  ap-
proaching  70%,  whereas  others  barely 
reach  58%. This differential implies that the 
margin  for manoeuvre  under this solution 
will  have  different implications depending 
on  the starting  point,  and  this  is  why the 
solution consisting of increasing activity will 
have to be studied at national level,  where 
it will  take  on  special  significance.  More-
over, the model needs to be finely-tuned to 
take account of the significant discrepancies 
which exist between men and women.  -
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2025 Variation of retirement rates 
Officially,  retirement age  in  most  Member 
States  is  65 years. The  actual pension age  is 
about 60 years. A first question is how an in-
crease  in the actual pension  age will affect 
the  economy  and  public  finances,  even  if 
there will  be  jobs  enough for such  an  im-
provement of employment.  The  first  tests 
suggest  that  this  solution  would  be  very 
profitable in the short term, producing sav-
ings on two fronts (reduction in the number 
of pensioners and rise  in the number of ac-
tive  persons).  The  repercussions  of such  a 
shift thus go well beyond a mere increase in 
activity rates. 
Variation in  productivity 
At first sight,  it might be  thought that fu-
ture  demographic  changes  could  be  bal-
anced  out by  increased  productivity result-
ing from the development of new technol-
ogies and  new forms of work organization. 
The  model shows  that in  the medium  and 
long  term,  the  rise  in  productivity  would 
have  to be  much  greater than  in  the past, 
particularly from the year 2005  (Figure  15). 
Without  such  an  increase  in  productivity, 
room  for  improvement  of  the  economic 
conditions for the active generation will be 
much  more limited than ever before. 
Variation of transfer rates 
This  solution,  consisting  in  changing  the 
sources  of financing of the burden of non-
active  persons,  is  drawing  an  increasing 
amount of attention, often in  view of the 
advantages  of  reducing  non-wage  labour 
costs to ensure competitiveness and growth 
and increase employment. 
The  formulae  discussed  under this  option 
may be summarized under two points: 
- an  increase  in  the number of contribu-
tors (in terms of the model, this can  be rep-
resented  by variations in the ratio between 
active and  non-active persons); 
- changes  the  level  of  transfer  rate 
between pensions and salaries. 
These two aspects can therefore be assessed 
by the model. At the moment, the model as-
sumes  a transfer rate  of 75%  and  the hy-
pothesis  that  all  active  persons  are  em-
ployees  with  wages  and  pensions  sharing 
their production. 
It will be  possible to act  upon the two hy-
potheses  in  order  to  measure  the  links 
between variations of the transfer rate and 
(a) the number of contributors and (b) dem-
ographic effects. 
By  definition, the present  model  takes  ac-
count only of the 'distribution' formula and 
therefore does not permit assessment of the 
effect  of demographic  ageing  in  a  mixed 
system  or capitalization system.  However, it 
does  have  the  advantage  of  providing  a 
clear idea, even if  a simplistic one, of the im-
pact of ageing on the economic cost of pen-
sions and on the limits to the different solu-
tions  which  could  be  envisaged  to reduce 
this impact. It is also necessary to emphasize 
the fact that this approach is supplementary 
to  detailed  analyses  of  social  protection 
contained  in  the  Commission's  report  on 
'Social  protection in  Europe'. 
-
41 
c:: 
0  ·c: 
~ 
c:: 
~  e 
:::l 
UJ 
Q) 
£ 
,!;; 
c:: 
0 
-~ 
:::l 
-~ 
"'  u 
~ 
~ 
8' 
E 
Q) 
'0 
Q) 
t= 42 
Figure 17 
More people at the end of  their life ... 
4 400 000 
Number of deaths expected (medium scenario) 
4 300 000 
4 200 000 
4100 000 
4 000 000 
3 900 000 
3 800 000 
·~  ~/ 
/" 
/ 
I  ..,  ........ 
,.,.  ........  _.., 
3 700 000 h11f-! 
i 
Figure 18 
The numbers of  very old people doubled or tripled 
3 
// 
/" 
/"' 
I 
Variation coefficient between 1995 and 2025 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
0.5 
0 
/ 
// 
// 
~  C'l 
<'I  ('I 
oo 
<'I  ('I 
C')  "<:!" 
C'l  C'l 
0  0 
C'l  C'l 
aged> 80  aged> 90 Health costs 
Experience  has  shown  how difficult it is  to 
control the increase  in  health expenditure. 
In  the  past,  this  increase  has  come  mainly 
from two non-demographic factors: the use 
of more sophisticated techniques, and a rise 
in the consumption of health care at all ages 
(where  a  link with  longer  life expectancy 
should perhaps be seen}. 
Some  studies on  this subject have also esti-
mated that 60%  of health expenditure on 
an  individual  is  concentrated  in  the  year 
preceding  death,  whatever  the  person's 
age.  It is  therefore interesting to consider 
trends in future numbers of deaths, in order 
to estimate health cost fluctuations. 
According to the medium population devel-
opment  hypothesis,  demographic  ageing 
will cause  the annual  number of deaths to 
increase from 3 725 000 in 1994 to 4 375 000 
towards 2025. This  represents  a relative in-
crease of 17.5%, the amount by which 60% 
of health  costs  will be  multiplied over the 
next 30 years solely as a result of the demo-
graphic effect. 
A second  factor must  be  taken  into account 
with regard to ageing,  namely the potential 
increase in the number of dependent persons. 
This subject calls for more careful investiga-
tion. Nevertheless, one way to approach it is 
to measure the rise,  between now and 2025, 
in the number of very old people, who are 
known to constitute a higher risk  of func-
tional dependence. 
As  becomes  absolutely clear  when  such  an 
indicator is represented in graphic form, it is 
above  all  the  number of very  old  people 
which is  set to go up (to nearly three times 
today's figure}. 
If it emerged that health costs for old peo-
ple were correlated with age, future demo-
graphic trends would thus  increase  health 
costs even further. 
-
43 Societal aspects 
The quantitative approach to the effects of 
demographic  ageing  on  social  protection 
does  of course  necessitate the construction 
of  multivariate  models  for  economic  and 
demographic  forecasting.  However,  under 
no circumstances should it exclude the social 
dimension  or a qualitative approach.  One 
potential  basis  for  the  latter  is  the  work 
done  by  the European  Observatory  of the 
Elderly,  which  in  some  cases  reveals  major 
inequalities within the elderly  population. 
Such  inequalities  are  increasing  and  are 
closely related to differences between indi-
vidual  countries'  social  policies.  For  exam-
ple,  differences  between  pensioners'  and 
workers' incomes, and  between pension in-
comes for men  and  women, are  increasing. 
Given that a rise  in the number of inequal-
ities constitutes a threat to social  cohesion, 
this represents a major challenge to modern 
societies. 
At the same  time as  demographic ageing, 
the present  precariousness  of employment 
and  the often high rate  of unemployment 
affect  many  people's  pension  entitlement 
conditions and could lead to major discrep-
ancies  among  future  pensioners.  It might 
even cause some of them to suffer social ex-
clusion. Under such circumstances, what will 
become  of  the  contract  of  solidarity 
between generations? 
At an  individual  level,  it has  been  shown 
that  networks  of  interpersonal  relations 
grow more fragile with age, with the loss of 
work-related contacts  and  the gradual  dis-
appearance of friends of the same age,  not 
to  mention  the  death  of  one's  partner, 
which  affects  women  more  owing  to the 
difference in mortality. Apart from the diffi-
culties  relating  to  social  integration  or 
autonomy which these changes in relations 
can  give rise to, many older people's needs 
in  terms of housing  or psychological/physi-
cal  assistance also change significantly. 
It is  therefore by  no  means  superfluous to 
reiterate  the  fact  that solidarity  between 
generations  is  still  an  active  force  in  Euro-
pean society. This solidarity is expressed  not 
only in the mechanism of transfers between 
incomes, but also in much more subtle ways, 
which  are  difficult  to  quantify:  the  time 
spent looking after dependent persons,  for 
example.  Even  in  societies  in  which  family 
ties seem  the weakest, the importance and 
intimate quality of interpersonal  relations 
'at a distance'  has  been  observed  in  rela-
tions between generations. This  represents 
capital built up over many years,  and it will 
be essential to ensure that the phenomenon 
is  preserved.  -
45 Conclusion 
T 
hese modest attempts to quantify the 
effects of demographic changes repre-
sent  a  follow-up  to the  conclusions 
adopted  by  the  Commission  in  its  White 
Paper  'Growth,  competitiveness  and  em-
ployment', in  that they emphasize  how,  in 
the medium and long term, the pressure of 
demographic ageing  will require sustained 
efforts in  respect  of employment and  eco-
nomic growth. 
In  this context,  the aim  of the report is  to 
give  an  input both to the debate  initiated 
by  the Commission  on  the future of social 
protection and  to the development of the 
European employment strategy. 
One of the key aspects of coping with the fi-
nancial  burden  imposed  by  demography  is 
better adaptation of the labour market and 
training to the  needs  resulting  from  these 
changes.  The  market  requires  significantly 
higher-level skills and, rather than seeking to 
reduce spending, it would be more beneficial 
to think along the lines of investment: invest-
ment in human capital, economic investment 
to create jobs,  and  social  investment to en-
courage occupational activity, etc. 
The European social  model must also evolve· 
if its fundamental objectives are to be  pre-
served. It has developed in a context of mass 
production and stability in terms of employ-
ment and  skills,  commercial  models,  family 
structures  and  working-age  population,  a 
situation which no longer exists today. Very 
significant changes  have taken place in the 
course  of the century,  in  terms of techno-
logical change, specialization, and equal op-
portunities for men and women and for dif-
ferent social categories. 
Since  demographic  forecasting  helps  to 
place  all  these  matters  in  a medium- and 
long-term  perspective,  the European  Com-
mission  intends to pursue  its  efforts in this 
field. One of its wishes  is to intensify scien-
tific cooperation with the national author-
ities.  Such  cooperation, which  must  be  de-
veloped  in  line  with  available  resources, 
should  cover  a  whole  range  of  clearly-
defined  objectives,  such  as  comparison  of 
methods,  improvement of models  and  en-
hancement of the statistical database. 
This cooperation would produce significant 
results and should make it possible to: 
(i)  increase  knowledge  of  the  impact  of 
demographic  trends  on  employment  poli-
cies,  social  policy  and  various  other policy 
areas; 
(ii)  stimulate  discussion  within  the  Union 
with all the parties concerned by the conse-
quences of demographic changes. 
The  main  objective  of this  procedure  is  to 
provide the Member States with a reference 
framework for more efficient comparisons, 
together with the necessary material for in-
creased scientific cooperation.  -
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Annex 
Comparative indicators of the effects of demographic ageing 
at national level 
Figure A 
Population growth (96) between 1995 and 2025 for three age groups - Medium scenario 
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